We construct a machine that knows its own code, at the price of not knowing its own factivity.
Introduction
It is well known that a suitably idealized mechanical "knowing agent" capable of logic, arithmetic, and self-reflection, cannot know the index of a Turing machine that represents its own knowledge. See Lucas [7] , Benacerraf [2] , Reinhardt [10] , Penrose [8] , Carlson [4] , and Putnam [9] . However, the proofs always involve (in various guises) the machine knowing its own factivity: that the machine satisfies K(Kφ → φ). We will relax this requirement and explicitly construct a machine that knows its own code. The construction resembles that of [4] and [6] .
Our result should be compared with that of Carlson [4] , who showed that a truthful knowing agent can know its own truth and know that it has some code, without knowing which code. A machine can know its own factivity as well as that it has some code (without knowing which), or it can know its own code exactly but not know its own factivity (despite actually being factive). This dichotomy in machine knowledge was first presented in the author's dissertation [1] .
In Section 2, we discuss preliminaries. In Section 3, we construct a machine and prove that it knows its own code.
Preliminaries
We will work in the language L of Epistemic Arithmetic of S. Shapiro [11] . This is the language of Peano arithmetic (with variables x, y, z, . . ., constant symbol 0, unary function symbol S for successor, and binary function symbols + and · for addition and multiplication), extended by a modal operator K for knowledge. The well-formed formulas of L (and their free variables φ → F V (φ)) are defined in the usual way; a formula of the form K(φ) is called purely modal, and will be written Kφ if no confusion results. Formulas without free variables are sentences. Terms, substitutability, and the result φ(x|t) of substituting term t for variable x in φ, are defined in the obvious ways. We borrow the following semantics from T.J. Carlson [4] (pp. 54-55). We have reworded the definition in an equivalent form (except that Carlson allowed for multiple operators while we need only one). The intuition is that purely modal formulas should be treated as much like propositional atoms as possible. 1. If U is some set, an assignment into U is a function that maps variables of L into U .
2.
If s is an assignment into U , x is a variable, and u ∈ U , s(x|u) shall mean the assignment into U that agrees with s except that it maps x to u.
3. An L -structure M consists of a first-order structure M 0 for the first-order part of L , together with a function that takes one assignment s (into the universe of M 0 ) and one purely modal formula 
5.
If Σ is a set of L -sentences and φ is an L -formula, we write Σ |= φ to indicate that for every
6. An L -formula φ is valid if ∅ |= φ.
Lemma 1. (Completeness and compactness)
1. The set of valid L -formulas is r.e.
2. For any r.e. set Σ of L -sentences, {φ : Σ |= φ} is r.e.
3.
There is an effective procedure that, given (a Gödel number of) an r.e. set Σ of L -sentences, outputs (a Gödel number of) {φ : Σ |= φ}.
If Σ is a set of L -sentences and Σ
|= φ, there is a finite set σ 1 , . . . , σ n ∈ Σ such that 2 σ 1 → · · · → σ n → φ is valid.
Proof. Straightforward.
Definition 2. The axioms of Peano arithmetic for L consist of the axioms of Peano arithmetic, with the induction schema extended to L . To be precise, the axioms of Peano arithmetic for L are as follows. 1 . ∀x(S(x) = 0).
∀x∀y(S(x)
Definition 3.
• The pre-closure axioms of knowledge are given by the following schemata.
-E1: The universal closure of Kφ whenever φ is valid.
-E2: The universal closure of K(φ → ψ) → Kφ → Kψ.
-E3: The universal closure of Kφ → φ. 1 The full Substitution Lemma, where variable y is replaced by an arbitrary term t, is not generally valid in modal logic. 2 Throughout the paper, A → B → C is shorthand for A → (B → C), and similar for longer implication chains.
-E4: The universal closure of Kφ → KKφ.
• The axioms of knowledge consist of the pre-closure axioms of knowledge along with Kφ whenever φ is a pre-closure axiom of knowledge.
• The axioms of epistemic arithmetic consist of the pre-closure axioms of knowledge along with Kφ whenever φ is a pre-closure axiom of knowledge or φ is an axiom of Peano arithmetic for L .
• The axioms of knowledge mod factivity consist of the pre-closure axioms of knowledge along with Kφ whenever φ is an instance of E1, E2, or E4.
• The axioms of epistemic arithmetic mod factivity consist of the pre-closure axioms of knowledge along with Kφ whenever φ is an instance of E1, E2, E4, or an axiom of Peano arithmetic for L . • ∃eK∀x(Kφ ↔ x ∈ W e ), whenever F V (φ) ⊆ {x}.
Reinhardt demonstrated that a formalization of "I am a Turing machine and I know which one" cannot be consistent with epistemic arithmetic. To do this, he found a particular instance of Reinhardt's schema that was inconsistent with epistemic arithmetic. A truthful mechanical knowing agent that knows its own code necessarily knows all instances of Reinhardt's schema (for example, suppose φ is the formula "the xth Turing machine runs forever"; if I know my own code, I can deduce a code for the set of those n ∈ N such that I know the nth Turing machine runs forever).
We will show that Reinhardt's schema is consistent (in fact, ω-consistent, by which we mean it has a structure with universe N where the symbols of Peano arithmetic are given the usual interpretations) with epistemic arithmetic mod factivity.
This result should be compared with the main result of [4] . Along with the above schema, Reinhardt introduced ( [10] , p. 320) a weaker schema, Reinhardt's strong mechanistic thesis, K∃e∀x(Kφ ↔ x ∈ W e ). 3 
Reinhardt conjectured, and Carlson proved
4 , that the strong mechanistic thesis is consistent with epistemic arithmetic. Thus we have a dichotomy: a truthful knowing machine can know it is some machine (but not which one), and also know itself to be truthful; alternatively, a truthful knowing machine can know precisely which machine it is, but not know itself to be truthful.
The Construction
Definition 5. Suppose φ is an L -sentence and s is an assignment into N. We define φ s to be the sentence φ s = φ(x|s(x))(y|s(y)) · · · obtained by replacing each free variable in φ by a numeral for the natural number it is assigned to.
For example, if s(x) = 0 and s(y) = 2, then (x = y) s is the sentence (0 = S(S(0))). The machine we construct will have the following form for a certain well-chosen set Σ. Definition 6. If Σ is a set of L -sentences, let M Σ be the L -structure with universe N, in which symbols of Peano arithmetic are interpreted in the usual way, and in which knowledge is interpreted so that for all L -formulas φ and assignments s into N,
Lemma 2. For any Σ as in Definition 6, M Σ really is an L -structure.
Proof.
We must verify the conditions on M Σ |= Kφ[s] from Definition 1. Let s be an assignment into N.
• (a) If x is not free in φ, then φ s does not depend on s(x), so neither does Σ |= φ s , so neither does
• (b) An easy inductive argument shows that any time ψ is an alphabetic variant of φ, for any assignment s into N, ψ s is an alphabetic variant of φ s . Another easy induction shows that whenever ψ is an alphabetic variant of φ, ψ ↔ φ is valid, so certainly Σ |= φ ↔ ψ. It follows that (when ψ is an alphabetic variant of φ) M Σ |= Kφ[s] if and only if M Σ |= Kψ[s].
• (c) (Weak Substitution) Let x and y be variables. An easy inductive argument shows that for all assignments t into N and all formulas φ such that y is substitutable for x in φ, φ(x|y) 
Proof. Let s be an assignment and suppose
Lemma 5. For any Σ as in Definition 6, M Σ satisfies the axioms of Peano arithmetic for L .
Proof. Let M = M Σ . Let ψ be an axiom of Peano arithmetic. If ψ is any other axiom besides an instance of induction, M |= ψ because M has universe N and interprets the symbols of Peano arithmetic in the intended ways. But suppose ψ is a universal closure of
Let s be an assignment and assume
, so in summary:
• M |= φ s(x|0) .
•
Therefore, by mathematical induction, M |= φ s(x|m) for every m ∈ N. By Lemma 3, for all m ∈ N,
Lemma 6. Suppose Σ (as in Definition 6) is closed under K, by which we mean that for every φ ∈ Σ, Kφ ∈ Σ. Furthermore, assume Σ contains all instances of E1 and E2 from Definition 3. Then M Σ satisfies all instances of E4.
. This means Σ |= φ s . By Lemma 1 there are finitely many σ 1 , . . . , σ n ∈ Σ such that σ 1 → · · · → σ n → φ s is valid. Thus, the universal closure of K(σ 1 → · · · → σ n → φ s ) is an instance of E1, hence in Σ. By repeated instances of E2 in Σ, Σ implies the universal closure of
Definition 7. By assigned validity we mean the following schemata of L -sentences:
• φ s , whenever φ is valid and s is any assignment. Definition 8. For every n ∈ N, let Σ(n) be the family of axioms consisting of the following L -schemata. 1 . E1, E2, and E4.
2. The axioms of Peano arithmetic for L .
• Here • denotes canonical Gödel number, • denotes numeral, and •, • abbreviates a definition (in Peano arithmetic) of a canonical computable bijection N 2 → N.
4. Assigned validity. 5 . Kφ, whenever φ is an instance of any of lines 1-4 or (recursively) 5.
Lemma 8. For every n ∈ N and every φ ∈ Σ(n), φ is a sentence.
Proof. By inspection.
Lemma 9.
There is a total computable function f : N → N such that for every n, W f (n) = { m, φ ∈ N : φ is a formula with F V (φ) ⊆ {x} and Σ(n) |= φ(x|m)}.
Proof. Follows from Lemma 1 and the Church-Turing Thesis.
Corollary 10.
There is an n ∈ N such that W n = { m, φ ∈ N : φ is a formula with F V (φ) ⊆ {x} and Σ(n) |= φ(x|m)}.
Proof. By Kleene's Recursion Theorem and Lemma 9.
Proposition 11. Let n be as in Corollary 10. Then M Σ(n) |= Σ(n).
Proof. For brevity, write Σ for Σ(n) and M for M Σ(n) .
Claim 1 M satisfies all instances of E1. By Lemma 7.
Claim 2 M satisfies all instances of E2. By Lemma 4. 
